

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

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FM USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2718

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

USMISSION NATO

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 SALT TWO GENEVA 294

EXDIS/SALT

DEPT ALSO PASS DOD

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: DEPUTY MINISTER SEMENOV'S STATEMENT OF AUGUST 19, 1975

(SALT TWO-734)

THE FOLLOWING IS STATEMENT DELIVERED BY DEPUTY MINISTER
SEMENOV AT THE SALT TWO MEETING OF AUGUST 19, 1975 INCLUDING
LANGUAGE FOR ARTICLES XII AND III.1.

QUOTE

SENE NOV STATEMENT, AUGUST 19, 1975

I

ACCORDING TO INSTRUCTIONS, THE DELEGATIONS FACE THE TASK
OF PREPARING FOR THE JOINT DRAFT OF THE NEW AGREEMENT THE
WORDING OF PROVISIONS WHICH, BEING ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH SIDES,
WOULD ACCURATELY EXPRESS THE SUBSTANCE OF THE EXISTING UNDER-
STANDING BETWEEN OUR STATES.

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THIS ALSO APPLIES TO THE TASK OF ACCURATELY AND CORRECTLY REFLECTING IN THE DRAFT OF THE FUTURE AGREEMENT AN APPROPRIATE PROVISION CONCERNING THE LIMITATION ON THE STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY SYSTEMS OF THE SIDES, TO BE ESTABLISHED AT AN AGGREGATE NUMBER NOT TO EXCEED 2,400.

THE CORRESPONDING FORMULATIONS, REFLECTING THE EXISTING UNDERSTANDING ON THIS SCORE, ARE GATHERED IN ARTICLE III OF THE JOINT DOCUMENT OF MAY 7, 1975.

IN THE INTERESTS OF REACHING AGREEMENT ON THE PROVISIONS OF THIS ARTICLE FOR INCLUSION IN THE JOINT DRAFT, THE USSR DELEGATION HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO TABLE A NEW PROPOSAL WITH RESPECT TO ARTICLE III, PAR. 1, READING AS FOLLOWS.

BEGIN BRACKETS. NEW PROPOSED TEXT OF ARTICLE III, PAR. 1, ATTACHED HERETO, WAS READ AND HANDED OVER. END BRACKETS.

THE NEW WORDING OF THIS PROVISION OF THE DRAFT TAKES INTO ACCOUNT THE CONSIDERATIONS EXPRESSED IN THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, AND REPRESENTS, WE ARE CONVINCED, AN IMPORTANT STEP TOWARD BRINGING THE POSITIONS OF THE SIDES ON THIS ISSUE CLOSER TOGETHER.

II

IN THE COURSE OF THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS THE SIDES HELD AN EXTENSIVE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THE QUESTION OF HOW TO BRING THE NUMBER OF STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY VEHICLES IN THE POSSESSION OF THE SIDES INTO CONFORMITY WITH THE LIMITATIONS BEING ESTABLISHED FOR THEM WITHIN THE OVERALL MAXIMUM LEVELS, AS WELL AS ON THE QUESTION OF THE TIME FRAME FOR BRINGING THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS IN THE POSSESSION OF THE SIDES INTO CONFORMITY WITH THE ENVISAGED AGGREGATE LEVELS. IT WAS EMPHASIZED THAT IN WORKING OUR PROVISIONS FOR THE DRAFT OF THE NEW AGREEMENT, THE SIDES MUST BE GUIDED BY THE FACT THAT, ACCORDING TO THE EXISTING UNDERSTANDING, THE INTERIM AGREEMENT OF MAY 26, 1972 WILL REMAIN IN FORCE UNTIL OCTOBER 1977.

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AS A RESULT, THERE IS A SUBSTANTIAL PROXIMITY BETWEEN THE POSITIONS, RELECTED IN ARTCILE XII OF THE JOINT DOCUMENT OF MAY 7, 1975. THERE IS AGREEMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS IN EXCESS OF THE NUMBERS SPECIFIED IN THE NEW AGREEMENT, AS WELL AS STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS PROHIBITED UNDER THAT AGREEMENT, MUST BE DISMANTLED OR DESTROYED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROCEDURES AGREED UPON IN THE STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION.

DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS IT WAS ALSO EMPHASIZED THAT IN THE COURSE OF WORKING OUT FURTHER AGREEMENT ON THE WORDING OF ARTICLE XII, WE SHOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE USEFUL EXPERIENCE OF REACHING AGREEMENT ON SIMILAR PROVISIONS IN CONNECTION WITH CONCLUSION OF THE ABM TREATY, ARTICLE VIII OF WHICH DEALS WITH DESTRUCTION OR DISMANTLING OF ABM SYSTEMS OR THEIR COMPONENTS, WHICH THE SIDES MIGHT HAVE IN EXCESS OF THE NUMBERS PERMITTED UNDER THE TREATY.

IN PARTICULAR, AT THAT TIME THE SIDES BELIEVED--AND THIS IS VALID TODAY AS WELL--THAT A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF TIME WAS REQUIRED FOR DISMANTLING AND DESTRUCTION OF STRATEGIC ARMS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LIMITATIONS BEING ESTABLISHED ON THEM.

TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS HELD AND, IN PARTICULAR, THE CONSIDERATIONS EXPRESSED BY THE U.S. SIDE, AND GUIDED BY THE INTERESTS OF RECONCILING THE POSITIONS ON ARTICLE XII, THE SOVIET SIDE DEEMS IT NECESSARY TO INDICATE IN THE TEXT OF THAT ARTICLE THE SPECIFIC PERIOD OF TIME, WITHIN WHICH DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION MUST BE ACCOMPLISHED WITH RESPECT TO STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS WHICH WOULD BE IN EXCESS OF THE NUMBERS SPECIFIED IN THE AGREEMENT BEING WORKED OUT, AS WELL AS WITH RESPECT TO THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS PROHIBITED THEREUNDER.

THE USSR DELEGATION HAS INSTRUCTIONS TO TABLE A NEW PROPOSAL FOR ARTICLE XII, READING AS FOLLOWS.

BEGIN BRACKETS. NEW PROPOSED TEXT OF ARTICLE XII, ATTACHED HERETO, WAS READ AND HANDED OVER. END BRACKETS.

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IT FOLLOWS QUITE UNAMBIGUOUSLY FROM THE NEW WORDING OF ARTICLE XII TABLED BY THE SOVIET SIDE THAT THE SIDES UNDERTAKE TO DISMANTLE OR DESTROY ALL THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS WHICH ARE BEING LIMITED AND ARE IN EXCESS OF THE LIMITS BEING ESTABLISHED, OR BANNED UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT, WITHIN 12 MONTHS AFTER EXPIRATION OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT. THIS COMPLETELY ELIMINATES THE ISSUE OF MENTIONING CORRESPONDING DATES IN ARTICLE III, PAR. 1.

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INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

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EXDIS/SALT

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III

MR. AMBASSADOR,

AT THE MEETING TODAY THE USSR DELEGATION, ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM ITS AUTHORITIES, HAS TABLED CONSTRUCTIVE PROPOSALS ON A NUMBER OF ISSUES INVOLVED IN THE JOINT DRAFT OF THE NEW AGREEMENT BEING WORKED OUT: ON ARTICLE III, PAR. 1, DEALING WITH THE OBLIGATION OF THE SIDES TO LIMIT DELIVERY VEHICLES TO AN AGGREGATE NUMBER NOT TO EXCEED 2,400. THE NEW WORDING FOR ARTICLE XII PROPOSES A SOLUTION FOR THE QUESTION OF HOW THE SIDES ARE TO BRING THEIR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS INTO CONFORMITY WITH THE OVERALL AGGREGATE NUMBERS BEING ESTABLISHED UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT.

IN PREPARING THESE PROPOSALS OF THE SOVIET SIDE. THE CONSIDERATIONS EXPRESSED BY THE OTHER SIDE AT THE NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA WERE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.

I WOULD LIKE TO DRAW ATTENDTION TO THE FACT THAT THERE
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IS A SUBSTANTIVE INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PROPOSED

FORMULATIONS, WHICH MAKES IT POSSIBLE TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THE RESPECTIVE PROVISIONS OF THE JOINT DRAFT ON A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE BASIS.

IV

MR. AMBASSADOR,

AS YOU KNOW, ONE OF THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES ON WHICH THE NEW AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS WILL BE BASED IS THE MUTUALLY AGREED PRINCIPLE OF VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE AGREEMENT BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. THIS FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE IS REFLECTED IN THE AGREED PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE XVII OF THE JOINT DOCUMENT OF MAY 7, 1975, WHICH IN PAR. 1 SPECIFIES THAT FOR THE PURPOSE OF PROVIDING ASSURANCE OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT BEING WORKED OUT, EACH SIDE SHALL USE NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION AT ITS DISPOSAL IN A MANNER CONSISTENT WITH GENERALLY RECOGNIZED PRINCIPLES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW.

PAR. 2 OF THAT ARTICLE RECORDS THE OBLIGATION OF THE SIDES NOT TO INTERFERE WITH THE NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION OF THE OTHER SIDE, OPERATING IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE AFOREMENTIONED PAR. 1.

THE SOVIET WORDING OF ARTICLE XVII, PAR. 3, ALSO FULLY MEETS THE IMPORTANT TASK OF VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. WE HAVE REPEATEDLY PRESENTED DETAILED ARGUMENTS ON THIS SCORE, IN PARTICULAR, AT THE AUGUST 1, 1975 MEETING.

THE OBLIGATION PROVIDED FOR IN THE SOVIET WORDING OF PAR. 3, NOT TO USE DELIBERATE CONCEALMENT MEASURES WHICH IMPEDE VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS, ALONG WITH THE AFOREMENTIONED AGREED OBLIGATION NOT TO INTERFERE WITH THE OTHER SIDES'S NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION CARRYING OUT THEIR ASSIGNED FUNCTIONS, IS A NECESSARY AND ADEQUATE CONDITION REQUIRED FOR PROVIDING THE SIDES WITH ASSURANCE OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE NEW AGREEMENT. THE WORDING OF ARTICLE XVII, PAR. 3, PROPOSED BY THE SOVIET SIDE,

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IS BASED ON THE AGREED PROVISIONS RECORDED IN THE CORRESPONDING PROVISIONS OF THE ABM TREATY AND THE INTERIM AGREEMENT, WHICH HAVE STOOD THE TEST OF PRACTICE AND HAVE PROVED THEIR EFFECTIVENESS. A CONSIDERABLE PART OF PAR. 3 WAS AGREED UPON AT THE WORKING LEVEL IN THE COURSE OF AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS PRIOR TO THE RECESS, AND HAS BEEN CONFIRMED BY THE USSR DELEGATION OF AUGUST 5, 1975, PURSUANT TO ITS INSTRUCTIONS.

A FEW WORDS CONCERNING THE NEW WORDING FOR ARTICLE XVII,
PAR 3, TABLED BY THE U.S. DELEGATION AT THE AUGUST 8, 1975
MEETING, WHICH YOU ADDRESSED IN YOUR STATEMENT TODAY.

FIRST OF ALL, WE NOTE THAT THE NEW U.S. WORDING FOR THIS
PROVISION OF THE DRAFT OF THE NEW AGREEMENT OMITTS A FORMULA-
TION WHICH, IN THE CONTEXT OF ARTICLE XVII, CONCERNS ONE
OF THE IMPORTANT OBLIGATIONS WHICH HAVE PROVED THEIR PRACTICAL
APPLICABILITY--NOT TO USE DELIBERATE CONCEALMENT MEASURES.
INSTEAD, IT INCLUDED THE WORDS "ANY MEASURES OR PRACTICE WHICH
DELIBERATELY IMPEDES VERIFICATION." THIS FORMULATION IN
EFFECT MAKES IT POSSIBLE TO INTERPRET QUITE ARBITRARILY AND
SUBJECTIVELY WHAT IS MEANT BY SUCH "MEASURES" AND "PRACTICES."

IN THE PROPOSAL UNDER DISCUSSION FOR ARTICLE XVII, PAR. 3,
THE LIMITS OF THE EXPRESSION "ANY MEASURE" ARE SO AMORPHOUS
THAT IT COULD INCLUDE NORMAL TECHNOLOGICAL PROCESSES OF ONE
SIDE, WHICH THE OTHER SIDE COULD ARBITRARILY CLASSIFY AS
MEASURES WHICH DELIBERATELY IMPEDE VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL
TECHNICAL MEANS. IT IS CLEAR THAT SUCH A PROVISION, LACKING
A CLEAR DELINEATION, WOULD BY NO MEANS BE CONSISTENT WITH THE
TASK OF ENSURING THE STABILITY OF THE AGREEMENT BEING WORKED
OUT. ON THE CONTRARY, SUCH FORMULATIONS WOULD BE A SOURCE
OF THE PRACTICALLY ENDLESS SERIES OF ALL SORTS OF UNCERTAINTIES
AND MISUNDERSTANDINGS IN THE FUTURE.

AS FOR "PRACTICES," WITH RESPECT TO SOME TYPES OR OTHER
OF THE ARMS BEING LIMITED, SUCH PRACTICES ARE DETERMINED BY
DESIGN, TECHNOLOGICAL OR OTHER FEATURES INHERENT TO EACH OF
THEM, AND ARE THE EXCLUSIVE PREROGATIVE OF EACH SIDE. INTER-
FERENCE IN THE PRACTICES USED BY EITHER SIDE IS ABSOLUTELY
INADMISSIBLE, WHATEVER THE PRETEXT. AFTER ALL, WE ARE ENGAGED
IN NEGOTIATIONS ON CERTAIN QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE LIMITS.
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TATIONS ON THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS OF THE SIDES, AND
NOT AT ALL ON IN SOME WAY INTRUDING INTO THE SPHERE OF
ENSURING THE NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE SIDES.

PRACTICES ARE JUST THAT--PRACTICES, AND THERE IS NO BASIS
WHATSOEVER TO DIVIDE THEM INTO ANY SORT OF CATEGORIES, LIKE
DELIBERATE OR NON-DELIBERATE PRACTICES. THESE PRACTICES
DEPEND ON THE NATURE OF ARMS, THE SPECIFIC FEATURES OF THE
VARIOUS TECHNOLOGICAL PROCESSES INVOLVED IN CONSTRUCTION,
OPERATION, MODERNIZATION, CONVERSION AND OVERHAUL. ON THE
OTHER HAND, DELIBERATE CONCEALMENT MEASURES ARE THOSE MEASURES
OF CONCEALMENT, WHICH ARE DELIBERATELY AIMED AT IMPEDING
VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF COMPLIANCE WITH
THE OBLIGATIONS TO BE ESTABLISHED UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT.

THUS, THE CONCEPT OF "DELIBERATE CONCEALMENT MEASURES" IS ABSOLUTELY PRECISE, CLEAR, AND TESTED IN MANY YEARS OF PROACTICAL EXPERIENCE. ANY ATTEMPT TO MIX UP THIS CONCEPT WITH THE CONCEPT OF "PRACTICES" MEANS ONLY TO INTRODUCE AMBIGUITIES, AND CAN BRING NOTHING BUT HARM.

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EXDIS/SALT

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IT IS ALSO COMPLETELY GROUNDLESS TO INTRODUCE INTO ARTICEL XVII, PAR. 3, THE CONCEPT OF "MEASURES AND PRACTICES WHICH RESULT IN UNINTENTIONALLY IMPEDING" VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. THIS MORE THAN VAGUE CONCEPT WOULD IN FACT PAVE THE WAY FOR ATTEMPTS BY ONE SIDE TO INTERFERE WITH THE TECHNICAL ACTIVITIES OF THE OTHER SIDE, UNDER THE PRETEXT THAT, ALTHOUGH THE PRACTICE USED BY ONE OF THE SIDES IN SOME SPECIFIC INSTANCE MAY INDEED BE REASONABLE FROM A TECHNICAL POINT OF VIEW, NONETHELESS, IT SHOULD BE CHANGED, INASMUCH AS IT IS SAID TO IMPEDE VERIFICATION BY THE NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF THE OTHER SIDE. IN OTHER WORDS, THIS COULD MEAN THAT ONE OF THE SIDES WOULD HAVE TO ADAPT ITS TECHNOLOGICAL ACTIVITIES TO THE CAPABILITIES AND POSSIBILITIES OF THE NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION OF THE OTHER SIDE. AND HERE, AS WE CAN SEE, IS AN OBVIOUS CASE OF IN-

CONGRUITY.

THE DRAFT AGREED STATEMENT IN CONNECTION WITH ARTICLE XVIII, PAR. 3, PROPOSED BY THE U.S. SIDE, PROVIDES FOR AN OBLIGATION BY THE SIDES NOT TO ENGAGE IN "ANY ACTIVITY" WITH SECRET

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THE AIM "DELIBERATELY TO HIDE OR DISGUISE ANY DATA, OR OTHERWISE HINDER THE COLLECTION OF ANY DATA, INCLUDING TESTING AND DEVELOPMENT DATA." THE PROPOSED STATEMENT IN ITSELF REVEALS THE INNER LACK OF JUSTIFICATION OF THE FIRST SENTENCE OF THE PROPOSED WORDING FOR ARTICLE XVII, PAR. 3, OF THE DRAFT. IF ADDITIONAL ARGUMENTS AGAINST THIS FIRST SENTENCE WERE NEEDED, THEY ARE CERTAINLY ALSO PROVIDED BY THE PROPOSED AGREED STATEMENT.

AN ATTEMPT TO LEGITIMIZE THE COLLECTION OF ANY DATA PERTAINING TO STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, INCLUDING TESTING AND DEVELOPMENT DATA, UNDER PRETEXT OF VERIFICATION OF THE AGREEMENT BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS, DOES NOT IN ANY WAY FIT INTO THE FRAMEWORK OF THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS. HERE WE HAVE A DEVIATION INTO A SPHERE WHICH HAS NOTHING IN COMMON WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW OR THE OBJECTIVES OF THE NEW AGREEMENT TO BE CONCLUDED.

AT OUR MEETINGS THERE HAS BEEN TALK IN GENERAL TERMS ABOUT THE BROADER SCOPE OF THE OBLIGATIONS PROVIDED FOR IN THE NEW AGREEMENT, AS COMPARED TO THE ABM TREATY AND THE INTERIM AGREEMENT. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THIS ARGUMENT CANNOT BE REGARDED AS IN THE LEAST BIT CONVINCING IN THE CONTEXT OF THE AGREEMENT BEING WORKED OUT. THE SOVIET SIDE PROCEEDS FROM THE PREMISE THAT THE WHOLE TOTALITY OF THE OBLIGATIONS TO BE ASSUMED UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT IS VERIFIABLE BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, THE U.S. SIDE ALSO PROCEEDS FROM THIS PREMISE. WITHOUT IN ANY WAY BELITTling THE SIGNIFICANCE AND SCOPE OF THE NEW AGREEMENT BEING WORKED OUT, OR ITS ROLE ALONGSIDE THE SOVIET-AMERICAN AGREEMENTS ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC ARMS, I WOULD LIKE TO DRAW YOUR ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE XVII, WHICH ARE SIMILAR TO THE CORRESPONDING ARTICLES OF THE ABM TREATY AND THE INTERIM AGREEMENT, HAVE CONFIRMED THEIR VIABILITY WITH RESPECT TO THE WHOLE TOTALITY OF THE LIMITATIONS PROVIDED FOR IN THOSE DOCUMENTS, QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS WHICH ARE QUITE DIVERSE IN THEIR NATURE, AND COVER EXISTING ABM SYSTEMS AND THEIR PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS, AS WELL AS THOSE WHICH COULD BE DEVELOPED IN THE FUTURE, LAND-BASED ICBM LAUNCHERS, SLBM LAUNCHERS AND MODERN SUBMARINES. IN SHORT, THEY COVER AN EXTREMELY SECRET

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COMPLEX GAMUT OF THE MOST MODERN TYPES OF STRETEGIC ARMS. IN OTHER WORDS, THE SIDES HAVE EVERY REASON TO MAKE FULL USE OF THE EXPERIENCE GAINED IN WORKING OUT CORRESPONDING PROVISIONS ON VERIFICATION IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE ABM TREATY AND THE INTERIM AGREEMENT, WITH RESPECT TO THE DRAFT OF THE NEW AGREEMENT FOR THE PERIOD UNTIL THE END OF 1985, AS WELL.

MR. AMBASSADOR,

THE SOVIET SIDE CANNOT AGREE WITH THE APPROACH AND PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE XVII, PAR. 3, SET FORTH IN THE U.S. PROPOSALS AT THE MEETING ON AUGUST 8, 1975. THIS KIND OF APPROACH IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE TASK OF ACHIEVING A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION TO THE QUESTION UNDER DISUCSSION, AND CLEARLY GOES BEYOND THE FRAMEWORK OF THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS.

WE FIRMLY BELIEVE THAT A POSITIVE SOLUTION TO THE QUESTIONS COMPRISING THE CONTENT OF ARTICLE XVII, PAR. 3, CAN BE FOUND ONLY BY STRICTLY ADHERING TO THE PRINCIPLE OF THE ADEQUACY OF NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION FOR THE PURPOSE OF PROVIDING THE SIDES WITH ASSURANCE OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT BEING WORKED OUT. THIS IS PRECISELY THE BASIS FOR THE PROPOSALS OF THE USSR FOR ARTICLE XVII, PAR. 3, WHICH CONSTITUTE A GOOD FOUNDATION FOR REACHING AGREEMENT ON THE PROVISIONS OF THIS ARTICLE OF THE DRAFT.

TABLED BY SOVIET SIDE
AUGUST 19, 1975

OFFICIAL TRANSLATION

ARTICLE III, PARAGRAPH 1

EACH PARTY UNDERTAKES TO LIMIT LAND-BASED ICBM LAUNCHERS, SLBM LAUNCHERS, HEAVY BOMBERS, AND AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES OF ANY TYPE WITH A RANGE EXCEEDING 600 KILOMETERS WHEN HEAVY BOMBERS ARE EQUIPPED WITH THEM, TO AN AGGREGATE NUMBER NOT TO EXCEED 2,400.

TABLED BY SOVIET SIDE

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AUGUST 19, 1975

OFFICIAL TRANSLATION

ARTICLE XII

STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS WHICH WOULD BE IN EXCESS OF
THE NUMBERS SPECIFIED IN THIS AGREEMENT, AS WELL AS
STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS PROHIBITED BY THIS AGREEMENT,
SHALL BE DISMANTLED OR DESTROYED WITHIN TWELVE MONTHS
AFTER EXPIRATION OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT ON CERTAIN
MEASURES WITH RESPECT TO THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE
ARMS OF MAY 26, 1972, UNDER PROCEDURES AGREED UPON IN THE
STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION.

UNQUOTE.

JOHNSON

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